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nership debt could be proved. The Register held that it could,
and that the petitioner would be entitled to a discharge from all
his debts, copartnership as well as individual. Now, if the
judge had thought that the Register was wrong in this view of
the case, he would certainly have said so. But he does not say
so.. All he says is, "The debt in question is provable, whether.
there are any assets of the copartnership or not. If there are
any such assets, they must be administered according to the provisions of section 36 of the act,*and so must the assets of the
separate estate of the bankrupt."
From all which I infer the opinion of the judge to be that
when there are no assets of a copartnership to be administered,
a member of a late copartnership may, upon his individual petition, be discharged from all his debts, copartnership as well as
individual. In- this opinion I concur, and this is as- far as it is
necessary forme to go in order to dispose of the presen case.
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SUPREME COURT OF VRMONT. 1
AGENT.

Competency as a Wztes.-The common-law principle, that an ajent
is a competent'witness, either for or againdt the principal, to prove his
acts done, or contracts made, as agent, and his authority therefor from
his principal, is equally applicable to the case of a written 'contract pfirporting to be executed by an agent in the name and behalf of the principal, as to a case of. a verbal contract: Litie v. 'Bond, 40 Vt.
...
The main object of Gen. Stat. § 24, ch. 36, providing that no person
shall be disqualified as a witness in civil suits, by reason of interest as a
party or otherwise, was to remope, not, to create, disqualifications; and
the proviso, that when one party is dead or insane, the other shall not
testify in his own favor, was intended mainly as a limitation or exception
to the enabling clause; and this limitation or exception applies only to
.parties:Id.
An agent is not a party to a contract made by him in the naiie and
.. I
behalf 'of his principal: Id.
Where a note was signed "Richard Bond, by Stillman Clark," it was
held, that Clark was a competent witness in an action on said note against
Bond's estate,. after Bond's decease. Clark being an agent is not in
legal sense a party to the note: Id.
IFr6m W. G.Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Vt. Rep.
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The introduction of evidence by one. party, that might have been
excluded, had the other party objected to it, does not necessarily open
the door to the other party to introduce incompetent evidence. But
where the evidence introduced is a circumstance morally tending to
render the disputed fact more probable, even if so remote as not to be
admissible as legal evidence, the other party has a right to do away with
the impression it may create in the minds of the jury, by evidence of
the same character and force tending directly to meet and explain it:
Id.
Under this rule, thq evidence offered by the defendant and excluded,
to the effect that for several years previous to the death of Bond, he had
been in the habit of doing business with the Battenkill Bank; &c., was
.held
admissible: Id.
Also testimony to show that Bond was a good business man, and
accustomed to sign his own name to papers, and to do his own writing,
was admissible as Nearing on the probability of a statement of a witness
in behalf of the plaintiff, that on one ocasion Bond called on the witness, a daughter of Clark, to sign his name to a note in his presence,
and directed her to sign his name whenever her father wanted' her to:
Id
Refusal to deliver Goods to Principal.-A-refusal, by an agent, to
deliver to the principal, goods purchased with funds furnished by the
principal, entitles the principal to demand and recover of the agent the
funds placed in his hands: Safiord v. Kingskje, 40 Vt.
A refusal, except upon terms or conditions the other party is not
bound to accept, is equivalent to an absolute refusal: Id.
The conduct of a party may amount to a refusal. It need not be in
words: Id.
It is the duty of an agent, who buys goodi on commission, to be
delivered at a specified place, to separate them from goods of his own of
the same kind, left at the same place, and if he neglects, on request, to
perform this duty, at the same time claiming that the principal shall take
the whole, his conduct amounts to such a'refusal to deliver the goods he
purchased on commission, as will enable the principal to recover the funds
he left with the agent to purchase the goods: Id.
A. employed B. to buy, for him, certain lots of butter. B. bought
these lots and others, and left the whole together at the railway station,
the agreed place of delivery, and claimed that A. should take lots he, in
fact, did not order to be purchased. A. wrote B. to meet him at the
station, and designate the butter purchased according to order. To this
letter B. paid no attention. A. made no attempt to pick out the lots by
the marks upon the boxes. It did not appear but he might, by this
means, have selected the lots he had directed B. to buy. Held, 1. That
the request made of the agent was reasonable. 2. That the agent's
neglect to comply with it, was equivalent to a refusal to let the principal
have the butter unless he would take with it lots he had not authorized
the agent to buy. 3. That the principal was not bound to rely on the
marks upon the boxes, or to take upon himself the risk of attempting to
separate the lots bought by order, from those bought without order. 4.
That the principal, A., was entitled to demand and recover of the agent,
B. the funds placed in his hands to purchase the butter: Id.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

Payable on Demand-Reasonable Time of Demand -The payee of
a demand note payable in hemlock bark, given February 19th 1
(tmandea payment in the summer of ]S63, according to its terms,
requesting the defendant to have the bark peeled during the summer,
the season for peeling bark, and delivered the next winter, usually the
best time to draw it, all which the defendant agreed should be done.
Tfrid, that this demand was most appropriate to such a note, and the
defendant by failing to answer it, as he promised, became liable to p',y
the note in money. The payee could therefore recover upon the money
counts: Read v. Sturtevant, 40 Vt.
See Limitations, Statute of.
Memorandum by one Pariy.-A memorandum of a parol contract,
made and signed by one of the parties thereto in his private memorandum book, for his own personal use, is conclusive upon no one. It is
not a contract. It is, at most, but a piece of evidence not admissible in
"fnivor of the party, except when accompanied by proper parol proof, and
not competent against him, except as an admission, the force of which
ta be determied by proof of the circumstances under which it was
made:. Stannard'v. Smith, 40 Vt.
CONTRACT.

CRIMINAL LAw.

" Indictment-Lareeny-DuTplicity-Evidence.-Theindictment in this
case alleged that the respdndent, on the 9th day of September 1866, one
horse of the value of $300, one buggy wagon of the value of $150, and
dne harness of the value of $50, of the goods and chattels of W., felo.
niously did steal, take, and carry away, &l.
eld-, not bad for duplicity:
State of -TermontV. Cameron,-40 Vt.
Held, that the horse, wagon, and harness being taken at one time,
* constitute but one theft, and cannot be the subject of different indictments: Id.
The state, before resting, proved that the respondent, on the 9th day
of September 1866, hired a team of W., at Rutland, for.a short ride,
and, on the 14th, was seen drivinj a similar team on a cross road in
Warrensburih, N. Y.; that.nothing was heard of the respondent or the
team for several weeks; that on the 17th day of October 1866, the team
was found at Mechanicsville, N. Y. ilvid, that the prosecution made
out aprimafacie case: Id.
The respondent's witness, G., having, testified thaf the team in question was bought by respondent's brother, J., of a stranger, at Lake
George, N. Y., it was held competent for the state to show that J. was
then on the jail limits for debt, had failed in business, and had no visible
means of support, as tending to contradict G.A testimony: Id.
. One of the defences %i this case was an alibi. The court charged the
jury, that in order to convict the respondent the prosecution must stablish their whole case beyond a reasonable doubt; but, that if the alibi
was proven, they must acquit him, and refused, on request, to tell the
jury, that in order to convict the respondent they must find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he was not at the place of the alibi on the day in
question. .Held,that in this there was nb error: rd.
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The respndent rquested the court to. charge the jury. that the' f'ict
that the respondent had not taken the stand as a witness in his own
behalf should not be thought of,or taken into consideration by them to
The prejudice of the respondent. This the court refused, saying he
could not prevent their thoughts, but charged them, that the respondent's omission to take the witness stand should not be taken against him.
Hpld, that in this there was no error: Id.
The failure of the court, on request, as in this case, to prevent the
prosecuting counsel from arguing to the jury, that the omission of the
respondent to testify was evidence against him, constitutes such error
and irregularity as to require the verdict to be set aside, and a new trial
granted, and is a proper subject of exceptions: Id.
EVIDENCE.

See Agent, Contract.

LIMITATIONS,

STATUTE OF.

Promssory Note-Demand--Contract- Consideration.- A note,
dated March 14th 1832, "payable in officer's fees as constable," although
not in terms expressed to be payable on demand, or on request, is by
legal construction so payable; and no demand having been made until
189, it was held, that the note was barred by the Statute of Limitations: Thrall v. Estate of Mead, 40 Vt.
Where a debt is payable in specific property, a new contract made
before the debt has become payable, changing the mode of payment, and
extending the time, needs no new consideration for its support: Id.
The genieral rule in case of such debt is, that no action accrues until
request or demand, and that the statute does not commence to run until
demand is made, but the creditor may be guilty of such unreasonable
neglect in omitting to make demand as will set the statute in operation
without demand: _Id.
Where a note of $400, dated February 19th 1827, was payable in,
instalments in grain, the last instalment April 1st 1832, and in June'
1829, it was agreed between the plaintiff and maker that the plaintiff
should not call for the grain until the last instalment became payable;
and in the mean time the maker was to render guch services as constable
for the plaintiff as he should call for, from time to time, which were to
apply on the note; and before April 1st 1832, the parties agreed that the
balance due should be postponed to an indefinite period, and that the
plaintiff should still continue to receive his pay in the services of the
maker as constable, the latter agreeing to render such services as called
f'or from time to time, and if any balance still remained due, after deducting such services, the same should be payable at any time after April 1st
1b2, in grain, upon giving reasonable notice to pay in grain, it was
held, that no new consideration was required to support this agreement,
as to mode of payment, or extension of time: Id.
This case distinguishable from those where the debt-was already due
and payable in money when the new agreement was made: Id.
The maker having ceased to be constable in 1845, the balance then
unpaid on the note became payable in grain upon reasonable notice or
demand by the plaintiff, and it was held, that six years from 1845, was
the limit of a reasonable time in which to make demand, and that after
the expiration of that six year the statute began to run: Id.

